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Available online 24 June 20162 In order to compare the results from the different available studies, it is used
the following simpliﬁed classiﬁcation of the economic performance indicators:
 Gross proﬁt ¼ turnover (i.e., value of landings) – direct (variable) costs.
 Operating cash ﬂow ¼ gross proﬁt – ﬁxed costs.
 Operating proﬁt ¼ Operating cash ﬂow – depreciation.
 EBIT (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes)¼ operating proﬁt þ non ﬁshing in-
come (not belonging to the ﬁshing activity, e.g. subsidies, ﬁshing tourism) – non
ﬁshing costs.
 Net proﬁt ¼EBIT – taxes – ﬁnancial costs.1. Introduction
Most countries have the goal to manage their ﬁsheries to achieve a
combination of biological, economic, social, and political objectives
[1,2]. This is also the case for the EU's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).
According to Article 2 of the CFP [3]: “The CFP shall ensure that ﬁshing
and aquaculture activities are environmentally sustainable in the long-
term and are managed in a way that is consistent with the objectives of
achieving economic, social and employment beneﬁts, and of contributing
to the availability of food supplies”.
Furthermore, and in accordance with the resolutions of the World
Summit on Sustainable Development, the CFP establishes the objective
of restoring and maintaining populations of ﬁsh stocks above the bio-
mass levels capable of producing the maximum sustainable yield
(MSY).1 In order to reach the objective of progressively restoring and
maintaining populations of ﬁsh stocks above biomass levels capable of
producing maximum sustainable yield, the maximum sustainable yield
exploitation rate shall be achieved by 2015 where possible and, on a
progressive, incremental basis at the latest by 2020 for all stocks [3].
However, despite the general improvement in the status of manyx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.06.015
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ticle 14 of the CFP deﬁnes MSY as the highest theoretical equilibrium yield
be continuously taken on average from a stock under existing average
mental conditions without signiﬁcantly affecting the reproduction process.ﬁsh stocks that are exploited by the EU ﬁshing ﬂeet [4,5], approximately
half (48%) are still exploited at rates greater than FMSY [6]. Reducing
ﬁshing mortality on ﬁsh stocks to FMSY, generally means that in the
medium- to long-term, catches from such stocks would be higher than
at present, implying that the EU ﬁshing ﬂeet could improve on their
current economic performance. In other words, the EU ﬁshing ﬂeet is
currently losing potential economic rents because many ﬁsh stocks are
being exploited at rates that are not capable of delivering the MSY.
In this context, Willman et al. [7] show that by improving the
management of world marine ﬁsheries (through a signiﬁcant reduc-
tion of ﬁshing effort), the potential (operating) proﬁt of global ﬁsheries
could increase by $50 billion per year.2 Similarly, Srinivasan et al. [11]nder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Economic (or extraordinary) proﬁts are estimated when the opportunity cost of
capital is deduced to the (normal) proﬁts.
Full equity proﬁt means that the proﬁtability is estimated assuming that the boat
owner has no debts.
Economic (or resource) rents can only be equal to the economic proﬁts when:
(i) salaries are equal to the opportunity cost of labour and so no labour rents are
generated [8], (ii) vessels are homogeneous and consequently no intra-marginal
rents are created [9,10], and (iii) the administration is not extracting rents through
taxes (e.g. fuel taxes) or other tools.
In our study, it is estimated the operating proﬁt assuming full equity proﬁt.
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stocks globally is between 83 and 99 million tonnes annually and
consequently by not ﬁshing at MSY, the foregone yield to global
ﬁsheries was between 7% and 36% of the reported landings in 2000,
which equates to a potential landed value between $93 to $116 billion,
compared to the reported $87.7 billion in 2000 [12].
Based on the results of Srinivasan et al. [11], Sumaila et al. [12]
estimated that by rebuilding ﬁsh stocks to the levels that can de-
liver MSY, operating proﬁt of the global ﬂeet would increase by
$49.2 billion per year. The estimated increase in economic perfor-
mance is to a large extent due to a reduction in ﬁshing costs from $73
billion in the year 2000 to $37 billion per year arising as a result of
higher stock biomasses and lower ﬁshing effort. Sumaila et al. [12]
also estimate that the costs of rebuilding global ﬁsh stocks (which
may include payments for vessel buyback programs and alternative
employment training initiatives for ﬁshers) to be about $203 billion,
resulting in a net present value of $769 billion (discounted over a 50-
year period assuming a 3% annual discount rate).
The estimates from Willman et al. [7] and Srinivasan et al. [11]
relate to the long-term equilibrium situation and consequently do
not address the economic performance during the transition per-
iod to stock rebuilding nor the rebuilding costs. Sumaila et al. [12]
assumed a rebuilding period for ﬁsh stocks of 10 years, and esti-
mated that it would take 12 years after rebuilding begins for the
gains to exceed the costs (including buybacks).
Merino et al. [13] estimate that to achieve maximum economic
yield (MEY), ﬁsh stock biomass in the North Atlantic would need
to be 2.4 times greater than at present, which implies that ﬁshing
effort would need to be reduced by 53% compared to the current
level. They also estimate that the potential economic earnings
before interest and taxes (EBIT) at MEY for North Atlantic ﬁsh
stocks to be about €12.85 billion, which corresponds with a MSY of
approximately 12.66 million t. In other words, when considering
the current estimated economic EBIT of €0.63 billion, North
Atlantic ﬁsheries are only generating 5% of their economic po-
tential, largely as a result of ineffective ﬁsheries management.
For the Northeast Atlantic, Crilly and Esteban [14] estimate that
restoring 49 overﬁshed stocks (out of 54 stocks with available
information) to their full MSY potential could deliver up to €16.58
billion per year in value of landings (2.4 times the current value of
landings). If in order to restore stocks to levels that will deliver
MSY through the cessation of all ﬁshing, then compensation pay-
ments of around €12 billion (€10.56 billion in present value using a
3.5% discount rate) over the transition period (9.4 years) would
need to be invested. However, the operating proﬁt over the tran-
sition period alone would be €5.10 billion. Thus, restoring these
overﬁshed stocks would lead to a net present value of €138.56
billion over a 40-year period (2013–2052) [14].
Guillen et al. [15] investigated the long-term potential yields
that the French demersal ﬂeets ﬁshing in the Bay of Biscay could
obtain from the three main target species; hake (Merluccius mer-
luccius), Nephrops (Nephrops norvegicus) and sole (Solea solea).
They estimated that under 2009 economic conditions and ﬁshing
effort, the ﬂeet generated €24 million in operating cash ﬂow. To
maximise the aggregated catch from the three main target species
(multiple maximum sustainable yield, MMSY), ﬁshing effort would
need to be reduced to 48% of the 2009 level. While, if all three
stocks were to be exploited at or below FMSY, ﬁshing effort would
have to be reduced to 46% of the 2009 level. In addition, in order to
maximise operating cash ﬂow at €85 million, ﬁshing effort would
need to be reduced to 39% of current effort. Similarly, the Bay of
Biscay French Nephrops ﬁshery could generate an economic oper-
ating proﬁt of €31.6 million if it was exploited at MSY level, with
ﬁshing effort at 62% of the 2010 effort level, instead of the €1.8
million that would be achieved at the reported level of effort for
2010 [8]. Furthermore, MEY would be obtained when ﬁshing effortis reduced to 30% of the 2010 level, leading to €47.2 million in
economic operating proﬁt.
Merino et al. [16] investigated the long-term potential yields
that the trawler ﬂeet from Mallorca could obtain from the four
main target species; i.e., red mullet (Mullus surmuletus), hake
(Merluccius merluccius), Nephrops (Nephrops norvegicus) and red
shrimp (Aristeus antennatus). They estimated that under 2001–
2011 economic conditions and ﬁshing effort, the ﬂeet generates
€1.29 million in economic operating proﬁt. The aggregated catch
from the four species is maximised (MMSY) when ﬁshing effort is
reduced to 43% of the 2001–2011 level. If all four stocks were to be
exploited at or below FMSY, ﬁshing effort would have to be reduced
to 29% of the 2001–2011 level. While, in order to maximise total
economic operating proﬁt at €1.9 million, ﬁshing effort would
need to be reduced to 52% of 2001–2011 effort level.
According to the data reported in FAO [17], Northeast Atlantic
waters correspond to the main EU ﬁshing grounds and account for
more than 72% of the total EU marine catches. In the present study,
a surplus production model (SPM) is used to estimate the potential
operating proﬁt for the EU ﬂeet ﬁshing in the Northeast Atlantic
waters (area FAO 27) assuming that the MSY can be simulta-
neously achieved for all of the ﬁsh stocks exploited by the ﬂeet.
Where available, estimates for MSY are based on multispecies as-
sessments, although single-species estimates are used for stocks
for which no multispecies estimates are available. It is also in-
vestigated the potential effects of achieving FMSY over different
timescales as follows: (i) achieving FMSY in 2016 (tþ1), (ii)
achieving FMSY in 2020 (tþ5), and (iii) progressively moving to-
wards FMSY from 2016 to 2020. For each timescale scenario, three
different cost assumptions are made (see Section 2).2. Methodology
2.1. Model
The growth of a ﬁsh stock can be expressed in the continuous
version of the logistic model described by the differential equation
used in the Verhulst/Pearl surplus production model [18]. Changes
in biomass of an exploited population can then be expressed as:
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟= − − ( )
dB
dt
r B
B
K
H1
1
Where B is biomass, dB/dt is the temporal change in B, r is the
intrinsic rate of natural population growth, K is the environmental
carrying capacity for the population, and H is the biomass ex-
tracted in the form of catch (harvest).
The short-run harvest function follows the common Schaefer
harvest function [19], where the harvest is proportional to the
ﬁshing effort and the stock level:
= ⋅ ⋅ ( )H q E B 2
Where q is the catchability coefﬁcient and E is the ﬁshing effort.
The catchability coefﬁcient (q) expresses how effective the ﬁshing
effort is in relation to the stock level by a given ﬁshing ﬂeet. In this
study q is assumed to be constant and consequently does not
change over time (i.e., no technical change), while changes in E can
take place.
The proportional factor F is the instantaneous rate of ﬁshing
mortality, which is partitioned into two factors: ﬁshing effort (E)
and catchability (q), hence:
= ⋅ ( )H F B 3
This means that the harvest is proportional to the biomass, F
being the proportionality factor.
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level is derived as:
= − ( )H qKE
q K
r
E 4
2
2
This implies that harvest follows a parabolic curve as a function
of E, with a maximum harvest called the Maximum Sustainable
Yield (MSY) at a value of EMSY. The biomass that enables a ﬁsh
stock to deliver the MSY (BMSY) is K/2.
Following the sustainable harvest curve as deﬁned by Eq. (4), it
is not until the biomass recovers that harvests can achieve the
sustainable level expressed in the curve. However, in the steady
state the harvest does not change (i.e. the system is in equili-
brium). The general case (dB/dt‡0) is obtained integrating Eq. (1),
giving the equation of the dynamics [20–22].
α= ( )H qE K r
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5t t
t
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Ht and Et are respectively the yield obtained and effort exerted,
with respect to time t, while Bt is the biomass at the beginning of
the period t. Ht, as a function of Et and Bt, gives a monotonic
growth curve which is asymptotic at Bt. Thus the mean biomass
( B¯) during the period t is:
α¯ = ( )B K r
ln
7t
t
Eq. (5) can also be expressed as:
= ⋅ ⋅ ¯ ( )H q E B 8t t t
In order to compute successive years it is estimated the bio-
mass at the end of the period t (start of period tþ1) according to:
α
=
( )+
−
B B
e
9t t
r qE
t
1
t
The gross revenue of a ﬁshery is equivalent to the value of
landings (VL), and so equals the quantity harvested multiplied by
the price of ﬁsh. It is assumed the price of ﬁsh (p) to be constant
across time and quantity.3
= ( )VL p H 10t t
For this study, three different cost assumptions were made:
(1) Proportional costs: ﬁshing costs (TC1) are assumed propor-
tional to effort, implying a constant marginal cost of effort. This is
based on the homogeneous vessel assumption, where a vessel is
added to (or taken out of) the ﬁshery at the same cost as the
previous one. The cost function is proportional (linear) to effort at3 The use of constant ﬁsh prices is justiﬁed as:
 EU landings in the Northeast Atlantic are a small fraction of landings worldwide
(4%; according to FAO [17]), so variations in EU landings would have only a
minor effect on global production and are unlikely to have a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on ﬁsh prices in international markets.
 EU seafood production covers 44% of the EU consumption [23]. So, more than
half of the EU seafood products consumed need to be imported, and conse-
quently prices are largely determined by the international market. Seafood is
one of the most traded food commodities. Therefore, we expect just a substitu-
tion of origin effect, especially when forecasts estimate overall increases in the
seafood demand [24].
 And last, but not least, we did not wish to add more (noise) uncertainty to the
results. This way, results (costs and revenues) are directly related to the stock
recovery and the accompanying reduction in effort.a constant cost per unit of effort (c).
= ( )TC c E 11t t1
(2) Corrected costs: when considering the costs of changes to
ﬁshing effort, because ﬁshing capacity is often non-malleable (i.e.
cannot be converted to other uses easily), some of the costs may
prevail when effort is reduced (scrapping of vessels or otherwise)
and even if no ﬁshing takes place. There are some costs that will
still need to be borne, for example, depreciation and capital costs,
as well as any unemployment payments to redundant crew. Here
it is assumed that labour and capital costs correspond to 60% of the
total ﬁshing costs incurred by the existing ﬂeet with current effort
(E0). Hence the corrected costs for a reduction in the size of the
ﬂeet (reduction in effort) are the labour and capital costs plus the
cost of deploying the effort for the reduced ﬂeet (Et):
= * * + * * ( )TC c E c E60% 40% 12t t2 0
Transforming Eq. (12) it is obtained:
( )= + − ( )TC c E c E E0.6 13t t t2 0
and hence, corrected costs (TC2t) are estimated to be proportional
to effort deployed (Et) and 60% proportional to the effort reduction
(E0Et).
(3) Buy-back programme: the third assumption analysed con-
siders that a buy-back programme (i.e., scrapping and permanent
removal of vessels from the ﬂeet) is implemented in year 1, with
an initial lump sum payment to reduce effort to that required to
achieve FMSY. The buy-back costs are estimated by multiplying the
number of vessels that need to be removed from the ﬂeet (pro-
portional to the required effort reduction) by the historical average
cost of decommissioning a vessel obtained from Calvo et al. [25].
Subsequently, ﬁshing costs are considered proportional to effort.
Thus, the third cost assumption works as the ﬁrst assumption
while also accounting for the buy-back costs in the ﬁrst year.
Operating proﬁt can therefore be estimated by the difference
between the revenues generated (value of landings) and the total
costs, at any given effort level.
= – ( )Profits VL TC 13
where TC is obtained from summing the crew wage cost (crew),
estimates of unpaid labour (unpaid), energy cost (energy), other
variable cost (othervar), other non variable cost (othernonvar) and
depreciation (depreciation).
= − − − −
− − ( )
Profits VL crew unpaid energy othervar
othernonvar depreciation 14
So the cost per unit of effort (c) is obtained from estimating the
TC at the initial period and assuming the effort at the initial period
to be 1.
The operating proﬁt is calculated as full equity proﬁt, which
means the proﬁt that the boat owner would receive if the owner
had no debts.
To estimate the potential gains from rebuilding Northeast
Atlantic stocks to the level that is capable of delivering MSY, it is
estimated the difference between current value of landings and
the value of landings that would be obtained if all stocks were at
MSY.
Estimates of MSY in the Northeast Atlantic waters are only
available for a limited number of assessed species (s) and areas (z),
as reported in the Appendix. In order to estimate the potential
value of landings that the EU ﬂeet could obtain when all stocks are
at MSY, it is multiplied the potential EU landings at MSY for the
stocks with available information (MSYS,Z) by the species price
(PTACs,z) and raise it by a factor that relates the total EU value of
12
Table 1
Summary of the data used in the analysis (2013).Source: own elaboration from FAO
[17], STECF [6] and Calvo et al. [23] data.
Value
Total EU landings in Northeast Atlantic (million tonnes) 3.64
TAC information available (million tonnes) 2.34
TAC uptake landings (%) 80
Number of EU vessels in the Northeast Atlantic (FAO Area 27) 27,081
Yields at MSY for available TACs (million tonnes) 5.91
Mean price (€/kg) 1.24
Average buy-back cost per vessel (€ thousand) 218.5
Table 2
Summary of the AER data (in millions) used in the analysis (2013).aSource: own
elaboration from STECF [6] data.
STECF (2015) data Raised data
Landings weight (tonnes) 3.28 3.64
Landings value (€) 4064.8 4512.7
Crew wage costs (€) 1213.8 1347.5
Unpaid labour (€) 163.2 181.2
Energy costs (€) 860.8 955.7
Repair costs (€) 349.0 387.5
Other variable costs (€) 524.1 581.9
Other non-variable costs (€) 358.8 398.3
Annual depreciation (€) 502.6 558.0
Total costs (€) 3972.3 4410.1
Operating proﬁt (€) 92.4 102.6
a AER data are multiplied by 1.11 in order to raise cost data from the 3.2 million
tonnes reported in STECF [6], to the EU landings reported by FAO for Area 27 (3.64
million tonnes).
Fig. 1. Long-term equilibrium value of landings (revenues), costs and operating
proﬁt (€ billion) at different relative levels of ﬁshing effort (current level of effort
¼1.0) for the EU ﬂeet in the Northeast Atlantic.
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available total allowable catch (TAC).
)(∑= × × ( )MSY P
Potential Landings Value
Total EU landings value
Value of EU TAC landings 15S Z TAC, s z,
The logistic production function (Eq. (4)) that relates harvest in
value (H) with ﬁshing effort (E) can be delineated when it is es-
timated 3 of its points: the value of landings at the current effort
level (assumed to be 1), the point (0,0) and it is known that the
maximum point in the curve is the Potential Landings Value.
This allows us to estimate r, k, q and BMSY, in order to mimic the
behaviour of the aggregated Northeast Atlantic production. In this way,
it is possible to investigate how stocks are rebuilt when ﬁshing mor-
tality is reduced since changes in ﬁshing mortality lead to changes in
the harvest and total biomass levels (following (Eqs. (5)–9)).
2.2. Data
Total EU landings in the Northeast Atlantic (area 27) were ob-
tained from FAO statistics [17] (see Table 1). TACs were obtained
from the European Commission (2013b). Yields at MSY for the
species and areas were obtained from different literature sources
[13,15,26–28] (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Where no multi-
species or single species estimates were available MSY estimates
were generated by assuming a similar exploitation pattern on
stocks and change in level at MSY.
Average price for the EU landings in the Northeast Atlantic was
estimated from the 2015 Annual Economic report [6], by dividing
the value of landings by the landings weight for the Northeast
Atlantic.4 Similarly, cost per unit of effort (Table 1) was estimated4 Northeast Atlantic includes Northeast Atlantic, North Sea and Baltic Sea areas
in the 2015 Annual Economic report [6].from the 2015 Annual Economic report [6] data on total ﬁshing
costs for the EU landings in the Northeast Atlantic (Table 2).
Average buy-back cost per vessel is derived from Calvo et al. [25]
and estimated as the total public expenditure on the permanent
cessation of ﬁshing activities, divided by the total number of
vessels that have received such payments.
2.3. Scenarios analysed
There are carried out two sets of projections:
) Long-term equilibrium projections of revenues, costs, gross
value added (GVA) and operating proﬁt for four different
management objectives:
 Maximise proﬁt (MEY)
 Maximise production (MSY)
 Status quo (ﬁshing effort ¼1)
 Bioeconomic equilibrium5 (proﬁts ¼0)
) Medium term projections to 2035 of three alternative man-
agement scenarios to achieve FMSY
 Reduce current ﬁshing mortality to FMSY in 2016 (tþ1);
 Reduce current ﬁshing mortality to FMSY in 2020 (tþ5);
 Reduce current ﬁshing mortality progressively from 2016 to
reach FMSY at 2020.
Each of the above scenarios under option 2 was undertaken
using the three different cost assumptions detailed above (see sub-
Section 2.1): (a) proportional costs, (b) corrected costs, and
(c) buy-back programme.3. Results
3.1. Long-term equilibrium projections
The long-term equilibrium relationship for the EU ﬂeet in North-
east Atlantic waters between effort and yield, expressed in monetary
terms as value of landings, costs and proﬁts is shown in Fig. 1.5 Bioeconomic equilibrium or Open Access corresponds to maximum effort
level, and consequently employment that the ﬁshery could sustain in a non-loss
making ﬁshery [29].
Table 3
Long-term equilibrium estimates of value of landings, total costs, gross value added
and operating proﬁt (€ billion) and the associated relative level of effort for 3 dif-
ferent management objectives and for the status quo.
Management
objective
Representation
in Fig. 1
Relative
effort
level
Value of
landings
Costs GVA Operating
proﬁt
Max proﬁts
(MEY)
A 0.50 7.12 2.21 5.76 4.91
MSY B 0.62 7.38 2.73 5.70 4.64
Status quo C 1.00 4. 51 4.41 1.80 0.10
Bioeconomic
eq.
D 1.005 4.43 4.43 1.71 0.00
Fig. 2. Operating proﬁt (in € billion) of the EU ﬂeet in the Northeast Atlantic under
three MSY scenarios (FMSY 2016 [solid black line], FMSY 2020 [double grey line],
FMSY incremental [dotted grey line]) compared to the status quo [solid grey line]
for the period 2015–2045. The MSY projections are calculated and illustrated here
using two different cost assumptions.
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J. Guillen et al. / Marine Policy 72 (2016) 40–4744Fig. 1 indicates that current exploitation level (point C; effort
¼1.0) is close to the bioeconomic equilibrium (point D; ﬁshing
effort level 1.005). Furthermore, the difference between estimated
value of landings at MSY (point B; ﬁshing effort level 0.62) and
value of landings at MEY (point A; ﬁshing effort level 0.50) is
minor. This is also true for proﬁts (Table 3).
Therefore, if Northeast Atlantic waters were exploited at rates
that on average would deliver MSY, the EU ﬁshing ﬂeets could
expect to receive €4.64 billion more in operating proﬁt per year, or
€4.91 billion if exploited at the MEY level, instead of the €0.10
billion at current exploitation rates. Detailed results are presented
in the Appendix (Table A2).
3.2. Medium-term projections
To undertake medium term projections for each of the three
alternative management scenarios to achieve FMSY (represented as
FMSY 2016, FMSY incremental, FMSY 2020 in Fig. 2), three different
costs assumptions were made (see 2.1 above):
1. Proportional costs: ﬁshing costs are proportional to effort.
2. Corrected costs: ﬁshing costs are proportional to effort with a
60% correction.
3. Buy-back programme Fishing costs are proportional to effort,
with buy-back costs applied in the ﬁrst year of the projections
(tþ1).
In order to achieve MSY for all Northeast Atlantic stocks, ﬁshing
effort must be reduced by 38%. If it is considered that there are
27,081 EU vessels in the Northeast Atlantic [6], then the optimal
ﬂeet size to achieve MSY would be 16,790 vessels, implying that
ﬂeet capacity in the area would need to be reduced by 10,291
vessels.
The results indicate that under the ﬁrst and third cost as-
sumptions, operating proﬁt declines below current operating
proﬁt once the ﬁshing mortality is reduced to FMSY, and is not until
year three in the projections that operating proﬁt is higher than
current operating proﬁt (€0.1 billion). Under the second cost as-
sumption (corrected costs), operating proﬁt is predicted to fall
below current operating proﬁt for only one year (see Fig. 2 and
Table A3 in the Appendix).
The third cost assumption (buy-back programme) operates si-
milarly to the ﬁrst cost assumption while also accounting for the
buy-back costs in the ﬁrst year. In order to achieve MSY for all
Northeast Atlantic stocks, ﬁshing effort must be reduced by 38%.
Given that in 2013, there were 27,081 EU vessels actively engaged
in the Northeast Atlantic [6], and assuming a direct relationship
between ﬁshing effort and number of vessels, the optimal ﬂeet
size to achieve MSY would be 16,790 vessels, implying that ﬂeet
capacity in the area would need to be reduced by 10,291 vessels.
Assuming that such a reduction would be achieved through buy-
back programs and that the cost to buy-back one vessel is €218.52.1
76.2
60.7
68.8
Buy back programme
47.7
54.0
ted costs
narios (FMSY 2016 [black], FMSY 2020 [light-medium grey], FMSY incremental [dark-
2045). The MSY projections are calculated and illustrated here using three different
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When analysing the net present value for the period 2016–
2045 (see Table 3), assuming an annual discount rate of 3%, our
results indicate that under any of the three cost assumptions, all of
the three alternative management scenarios to achieve FMSY gen-
erate operating proﬁt at least 22 times greater than the operating
proﬁt obtained if no action is taken. Moreover, by delaying the
reduction in ﬁshing mortality to FMSY until 2020 instead of 2016,
more than 31% of the potential operating proﬁt is lost.
The third management scenario considered is to reduce ﬁshing
mortality progressively from 2016 so as to reach FMSY in 2020. In
this scenario, the estimated reduction in operating proﬁt in the
ﬁrst year is lower than in management scenarios 1 and 2, but the
subsequent increase above status quo operating proﬁt does not
occur until the third year (see Table A3 in the Appendix). Fur-
thermore, the estimated net present value (in operating proﬁt) for
the period 2016–2035 is between 9% and 10% lower compared to
the scenario in which FMSY is achieved in 2016.
When the buy-back programme costs of €2.25 billion are taken
into account, losses are expected in the ﬁrst year that the pro-
gramme is applied, but the beneﬁts exceed the costs from the
second year onwards (see Table A3 in the Appendix).4. Discussion
Exploiting ﬁsh stocks at rates that will restore and maintain
stock biomasses at levels capable of delivering MSY is a long-term
goal of the CFP. Indeed, the Green paper on the CFP reform re-
commends achieving the goal of restoring ﬁsheries to levels cap-
able of producing MSY by 2015 [30]; while, the 2012 reform to the
CFP (EU 2013a) requires all stocks to be ﬁshed at FMSY by 2020.
However, this goal has not been achieved for all stocks, and may in
part be due to the annual TAC decision process for which 7 out of
every 10 TACs were set above advice between 2001 and 2015.
However, trends indicate that the level by which TACs are set
above scientiﬁc advice is falling and that TACs are being brought
more in line with scientiﬁc recommendations-a positive trend
occurring alongside signs of stock recovery in some EU waters [31–
33].
North Atlantic ﬁsheries are currently producing less ﬁsh than in
recent decades despite some yield improvements in recent years
[4,5]. Nevertheless, for many ﬁsh stocks in EU waters, stock bio-
masses are less than those required to deliver MSY and many
stocks are ﬁshed at a rate that is not consistent with achieving
MSY.
Aggregated ﬁsheries production functions are not new and
have been used to assess the economic efﬁciency of global ﬁsh-
eries as a single exploited unit [9], at ecosystem level [14,34,35]
and at species-EEZ level [11]. Alternatively, SPMs have been used
to produce simple representations of the key ecological processes
underlying ﬁsheries [35]. For example, SPMs can be used to esti-
mate biological reference points such as the biomass level and the
rate of exploitation required to achieve the MSY of single ﬁsh
stocks or marine ecosystems. SPMs allow the extension of ﬁsheries
assessment into other disciplines beyond ecology. It is used an
aggregated form of a SPM to estimate the economic potential of
European Northeast Atlantic ﬁsheries under the assumption that
the MSY from all stocks exploited by such ﬁsheries can be
achieved.
Outcomes from this study, despite the high uncertainty, con-
ﬁrm that effort and capacity of the EU ﬂeet ﬁshing in Northeast
Atlantic waters need to be signiﬁcantly reduced in order to achieve
MSY and MEY management objectives. Moreover, results indicate
that the EU ﬁshing ﬂeet could generate a high proﬁtability if the
biomass of all exploited stocks were to recover to BMSY or BMEYlevels. Our estimates suggest that about €4.64 billion in operating
proﬁt per year (€7.38 billion in revenue minus €2.73 billion in
costs) could be obtained from the Northeast Atlantic ﬁsheries if
the biomass of all exploited stocks were to recover to BMSY and the
EU ﬂeet harvested the MSY. If Northeast Atlantic ﬁsheries were
managed at MEY, the EU ﬁshing ﬂeet could obtain €4.91 billion in
operating proﬁt. Even if these estimates may be imprecise, we
consider that they are indicative of the relative magnitude of po-
tential improvement in proﬁts. Note however, the above results
assume that catchability remains constant (no change in technical
efﬁciency). However, if increases in technical efﬁciency were
considered, the MSY could be achieved with a further reduction in
ﬁshing effort or number of vessels.
Proﬁts are obtained from an increase in revenues and a de-
crease in costs. It is well-known that if stock biomasses were at
levels supporting MSY or MEY they would be providing increased
revenues. In addition, because of the important effort reductions
that are required to deliver FMSY, total ﬁshing costs would de-
crease signiﬁcantly (about 35–50%). Even if the increase in proﬁts
only comes from the cost reduction side (a less uncertain result), it
is still a signiﬁcantly high value (about €2 billion), especially when
compared to current proﬁt of €0.10 billion. Anyway, similar esti-
mates for managing the whole North Atlantic ﬁsheries at MEY
were obtained by Merino et al. [13], who estimated proﬁt mea-
sured as economic EBIT to be €12.85 billion. These results are also
in keeping with Crilly and Esteban [14] and Sumaila et al. [12] who
conﬁrm that investing to restore overexploited stocks is econom-
ically proﬁtable. It should be noted that there is a trade-off be-
tween social (employment), biological and economic objectives;
reductions in effort and capacity are needed to achieve maximum
production or proﬁts and assuming no major changes in ﬂeet
structure, will consequently be at the expense of employment
levels.
Potential economic beneﬁts from the sustainable exploitation
of living marine resources, exceed the reported proﬁt for the
ﬁshing sector [7]. Indeed, our operating proﬁt estimates exclude
beneﬁts from related activities such as recreational ﬁsheries,
marine tourism, illegal ﬁshing, the economic contribution of de-
pendent activities such as ﬁsh processing, distribution, and con-
sumption. It also excludes the value of biodiversity losses, pollu-
tion, greenhouse gas emissions and food security.
In this study there are employed three different cost assump-
tions to investigate the sensitivity of the economic performance of
the EU ﬁshing ﬂeet operating in Northeast Atlantic waters when
stocks are rebuilt to the levels capable of delivering MSY. In as-
sumption 1, ﬁshing costs are estimated as proportional to ﬁshing
effort and consequently reducing ﬁshing effort to achieve a de-
crease in ﬁshing mortality will lead to a proportional decrease in
costs. In assumptions 2 and 3, rebuilding costs are assumed, as in
Sumaila et al., [12] and Crilly and Esteban [14]. In assumption 2, it
is assumed that costs are proportional to ﬁshing effort (as for as-
sumption 1), but in addition, it is continued to compensate the
ﬁshing effort that has been reduced with a 60% of the initial costs
(e.g. compensation is paid to capital investments and crew). In the
third assumption, it is assumed that costs are proportional to ex-
isting ﬁshing effort as in assumption 1, with a buy back (scrapping)
programme in the ﬁrst year that purchases and removes all excess
ﬁshing vessels.
There is considerable debate among ﬁsheries scientists on the
utility of single-species MSY estimates as ﬁshery management
reference points. Such estimates have been criticised because it is
ecologically and technically impossible to simultaneously ﬁsh all
species at MSY level in a multiple species ﬁshery [36]. Conse-
quently, the multiple maximum sustainable yield (MMSY) of
marine ecosystems is expected to be lower than predicted by the
sum of single stocks' MSYs [15,35]. On the other hand, using
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full potential of stocks after centuries of exploitation. In Table A1 in
the Appendix there are reported the MSY estimates used in this
study.
It is also important to take into consideration that MSY is a
moving target. An improvement in exploitation pattern (an in-
crease in the size and age of ﬁsh caught) gives rise to medium- to
long-term increases in stock biomass and yields and consequently
MSY also increases [37–40]. Similarly, if a stock is exploited by
different ﬂeets, yields can change when ﬁshing patterns (relative
ﬁshing effort deployed by such ﬂeets on different age- or size-
groups of ﬁsh) change, so the MSY could increase by changing the
allocation of effort between ﬂeets so that the exploitation pattern
improves [15]. For a given level of ﬁshing effort, improvements in
ﬁshing pattern give rise to increased potential beneﬁts in terms of
landings weight and stock biomasses. However, improvements in
ﬁshing pattern also give rise to changes in MEY, a priori it is un-
clear whether such improvements would lead to improvements in
economic performance and employment, as they could favour
ﬂeets that are less cost-effective or less labour intensive. Similarly
the reallocation of quotas between ﬂeets could lead to changes in
the ﬁshing pattern and consequently on the economic perfor-
mance of the ﬂeets and associated employment [41].
The sooner ﬁshing mortality rates are reduced to FMSY, the
greater the proﬁts’ net present value from EU ﬁsheries in the
Northeast Atlantic. Even if time paths for stock recovery may be
uncertain, economic beneﬁts will be evident, also in the short-
term. This is because the effort reductions alone lead to cost re-
ductions and consequently to overall proﬁtability increases by
about €2 billion, Furthermore, even higher revenues can be ob-
tained by ﬁshing when biomasses are capable of delivering MSY.
Note however that proﬁtability increases from effort reductions
are much more certain than those coming from biomass re-
coveries. Hence, if effort reductions are effected 5 years earlier,
(signiﬁcant) proﬁts are also going to be achieved 5 years earlier.
This 5-year lag has an important effect on the net present value.
Outcomes from our projections (see Table A3 in the Appendix)
imply that during the ﬁrst years of implementation, most of the
improvements in economic performance come from the reduced
costs associated with a reduction in the size of the ﬂeet. But in the
long-term, recovery of the stocks to levels capable of delivering
MSY is the major source of increases in proﬁtability, since results
from this study suggest that it represents 63% of the proﬁtability
increase when considering the proportional cost assumption and
80% when considering the corrected cost assumption.
For the realization of this study it has been assumed all stocks
(i.e., species) as one entity, behaving as the average of all in-
dividual stocks. Likewise, due to data limitations, it has also been
assumed that all ﬂeets and vessels behave identically. Despite the
above, it is expected that the economic performance of all ﬂeet
segments will improve when ﬁsh stocks are rebuilt, but the extent
of these improvements will vary by ﬂeet segment and by country
[6]. Such improvements will depend on the species composition of
the catches by the different ﬂeets because not all stocks are
overexploited to the same degree. Furthermore, the potential for
stock biomass to increase and the speed of stock rebuilding will
vary depending on their life-history characteristics of the stock in
question.
Stock recovery is highly species-dependent, with short-lived
species having the ability to recover more rapidly than long-lived
species. Costello et al. [42], found that under an optimal rebuilding
strategy, ﬁsh stock recovery requires between 4 years and 26 years
(with a mean of 11 years), depending on the species. Sumaila et al.
[12] assume a rebuilding period of 10 years (as in the Magnuson–
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of the USA).
Our study is in line with these rebuilding timelines and suggeststhat with current exploitation patterns, once FMSY is reached, it
takes about 20 years to fully recover stocks and take the MSY (at
99.99%), but after the 6th year yields are over 90% of their full
potential at MSY.
While the present study relates to the EU ﬁsheries in the
Northeast Atlantic, similar potential economic beneﬁts can be
expected in other areas if ﬁsh stocks can also be restored to MSY or
MEY levels. In addition, the establishment of a discard ban in EU
ﬁsheries could help to recover ﬁsh stocks faster if it can decrease
the ﬁshing mortality levels.5. Conclusions
The 2012 CFP reform [3] establishes the objective of restoring
and maintaining populations of ﬁsh stocks above the biomass le-
vels capable of producing the maximum sustainable yield (MSY)
and in order to achieve this objective, the maximum sustainable
yield exploitation rate is to be achieved by 2015 where possible
and, on a progressive, incremental basis at the latest by 2020 for
all stocks [3]. This implies that TACs should be set in accordance
with FMSY. Achieving such policy would result in great economic
beneﬁts and our results suggest that the EU ﬁshing ﬂeet could gain
an extra €4.54 billion operating proﬁt per year if all ﬁsh stocks in
the Northeast Atlantic could be exploited at MSY. Alternatively,
setting TACs that are not consistent with catches at FMSY (i.e.,
postponing exploitation at FMSY) could result in signiﬁcant fore-
gone proﬁts in the medium- and long-term for the EU ﬂeets op-
erating in the Northeast Atlantic.
Reducing ﬁshing mortality to FMSY is estimated to produce, in
the medium- and long-term, ﬁsheries rents signiﬁcantly higher
than those obtained at current exploitation rates. The increase in
medium- and long-term ﬁsheries rents compensates the initial
rebuilding costs just after few years. Moreover, the sooner ﬁshing
mortality rates are reduced to FMSY, the greater the proﬁts’ net
present value from EU ﬁsheries in the Northeast Atlantic.Appendix A. Supporting information
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in
the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.06.
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